


Christianity and Society

LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE COMING PERIOD

by

WILL HERBERG



THE INDUSTRIAL CHAPLAINCY: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS

by

DONALD L. BENEDICT

THE SOCIAL GROWTH OF AUSTRALIA

by

HARRY P. REYNOLDS

ACTIVITIES OF THE FELLOWSHIP

WINTER 1948-49

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CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

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EDITORIALS

The American Scene

The Presidential election proves how seriously a nation may misunderstand itself. All of us, from left to right, assumed that the era of the "New Deal" was dead. We thought that post-war weariness, the thoughtlessness which prosperity induces, the absence of a magnetic leader, and the inner contradictions within the Democratic party, which had been the somewhat reluctant bearer of the "New Deal," had made the victory of conservatism a foregone conclusion. Opinion polls substantiated these dismal prognostications. If anything more was required to reinforce the general pessimism, the revolt of the Dixiecrats in the south and of the followers of Wallace in the north proved beyond peradventure that Republicanism would win, and that the anachronistic creed of *laissez faire* would become the basis of politics in the most powerful nation of the west, at the very time when our democratic allies of Europe regarded the creed as a complete irrelevance.

The prophets were wrong. America proved that her political thought is moving more consistently in the main stream of modern political experience than any one had supposed. Despite a very weak leader the general philosophy of the "New Deal," which Truman had partly repudiated but to which he had returned in final desperation, won the allegiance of the majority of the American people. The quasi-communist rebellion under Wallace collapsed. The laboring masses supported the Democratic

ticket more vigorously than anyone had believed possible. A Democratic candidate won the election even though the Wallace rebellion cost him New York's electoral vote and the Dixiecrat rebellion subtracted four southern states from the Democratic total.

If any one should doubt the predominant temper of the American people, it need only be pointed out that the most unequivocal "New Deal" leaders won much larger majorities than the President and saved his ticket in four states. Governor Bowles of Connecticut, Governor Stevenson and Senator Douglass of Illinois, and Senator Humphrey of Minnesota gained majorities greater than the President, ranging from 100,000 to 450,000 votes, and undoubtedly pulled four important states into the Democratic column.

On the other hand it must not be assumed that the victory was due merely to a labor-liberal alliance. The miracle would not have been accomplished without majorities in the farm counties of Illinois, Iowa, Ohio, and California. Here Truman accomplished the impossible and regained the allegiance of the farmers, which had been given to Roosevelt only in the first two of his terms and which had been progressively lost to him in subsequent elections. Republicanism, since the days of Abraham Lincoln, has been an alliance between farmers and the big industrial interests of the cities. Without the mass support of the farmers, Republicanism is a political force of minor strength. The farmers deserted the Republican party in the early days of

the New Deal because they were facing bankruptcy and the farm credit program saved them. They reverted to Republicanism subsequently because they are by nature individualists, and regarded even the minimal restraints of the New Deal, particularly the war time restraints, as perils to their God-given liberties. They returned to the Democratic fold in this election, partly because they suspected that the Republicans might disturb the program of price-support for farm products; partly because the Republican congress had wrecked the grain storage program without which they could not hold their grain for government prices; and partly because the congress had wrecked the rural electrification program. The Illinois farmers flocked to Truman in droves because they were, at the very moment of the election, forced to sell their corn below the government price because they lacked the storage facilities to hold it for the higher price.

One conclusion which must be drawn from this performance is that nobody, whether industrialist or farmer, really believes in *laissez faire* consistently. Business interests want as little interference with their affairs as possible, but they do want tariff protection. Farmers do not want control of food prices, but they do want a "floor" under their selling prices. Labor would like to stop the inflationary spiral through price control, but it does not want to freeze wages. Yet it is not politically possible to freeze the price structure without some freezing of wages.

When these aspects of the recent "victory" are considered, it must be clear that the "New Deal" is not a simple victory for the principle that the welfare of the whole must take precedence over particular interests. No political struggle ever achieves such a victory in unequivocal terms. It was a victory rather for the farmers and the workers each primarily intent upon their particular interests. These interests happen to be more consonant with the general interests, simply because the interests of the broad masses are always more compatible with general interests than are the

interests of the small oligarchy of wealthy people. One realizes, when considering these aspects of the political order, that Karl Barth's observations on the justice of the state in his *Christengemeinde und Bürgergemeinde*, penetrate to the realities more profoundly than most moralistic treatises on politics. According to Barth the justice of even the best democratic state is partly the consequence of God's providence, manifested in a sometimes mysterious coincidence of particular interests with the welfare of the whole, rather than in a genuinely moral concern for the common weal.

The Middle Class in the Coming Decade

The plight of the middle class in our day will serve to prove very nicely that even the most providential concurrence between particular and general interests never achieves a perfect justice. Insofar as the Democratic victory represents a triumph of concern for the common weal, it will make a housing program possible in defiance of the real estate interests, a price control program in defiance of the mercantile interests, a rural electrification program in defiance of the utility interests, and a tax program in defiance of all the ideologues who have tried to make us believe that lower taxes would stop inflation through increased production. There is a possibility, in other words, that America will prove to the world that we are not a wilderness of unmitigated particular interests but a nation which has some concern for the common good.

But the plight of the middle classes will prove on the other hand that the concern for the general welfare is not perfect or consistent enough to guarantee justice to those who lack the political power to put in their claims. The American farmer has the political power and sagacity to insist on a price support program for his commodities that will prevent even the most phenomenal crops from reducing food prices in the cities. The laboring masses

have the economic power through strong unions to ride the inflationary spiral. Henry Ford II has recently invited the unions in his plant to ask for the fourth round of wage increases on the ground that rising prices make such a step imperative. Mr. Ford's gesture is significant because it has been apparent for some time that labor and capital are ready to ride the inflationary spiral together, capital no longer bothering to hold wages down through the risk of a strike, for that would interrupt prosperity. It is quite unnecessary, moreover, because a free economy makes it quite easy to raise prices to compensate the industrialist for increased wages. Mr. Walter Reuther is the only labor leader who has shown a profound concern about the unwisdom of this procedure.

Ordinarily an inflationary spiral in a free economy finally culminates in a "bust" of crisis and unemployment. This danger is not too great in the present instance because the European Recovery Program and the armament program will take up the slack, which is due to the fact that many people are being "priced" out of the market. All this means that the "middle classes," the people with fixed incomes, those living on fixed pensions or small savings, white collar workers and salaried professional workers, particularly teachers, will be the real victims of the inflationary spiral. They lack the political unity to effect political policy and they have no economic organization to force a rise in their wages. They have indeed achieved some increases in wages because there is enough sense of justice in the community to take cognizance of their plight; but they have in no case received wage increases equal to the rise in living costs because they lack the power to enforce their claims. Sometimes they work for non-profit institutions which would be wrecked if their wages would be brought to the right level.

It may be that the labor-farmer alliance, which is in power in the new administration, will recognize the importance of holding down the inflationary spiral in the interest both of the nation and of the

middle class victims of the spiral. On the other hand it will be tempted not to deal rigorously with the problem, because a rigorous approach would require both a review of the price support program for the farmers and a modified stabilization of wages in a stabilized price structure. It will be interesting to observe how much social wisdom and moral concern is expressed in the political programs of the coming year. This will be interesting because the relation between self-interest and concern for the common good is never fixed in any group or in any situation. It is barely possible that we will have a "New Deal" in which parochial interests are more genuinely transcended than now seems possible. "If hopes are dupes, fears may be liars." Political realities are misunderstood by both consistent cynics and consistent sentimentalists.

The Plight of China

It is now apparent that the Chinese government is slowly disintegrating. For the past three years it has consistently lost moral authority and political and military power. The communist movement continues to encroach upon its domains. Had the Republican party won, we would no doubt have thrown billions into China in order to avert the disaster of a communist-controlled China. It must be apparent, however, that foreign support alone can not save a government which progressively loses its moral authority through corruption and inefficiency. Such support has the opposite effect because it exposes it to the contumely of its enemies and subjects it to the charge that it is merely a front for foreign interests.

For this reason we believe that Secretary Marshall is to be commended for his severely criticised reluctance to give support to the Chinese government. On the other hand the alternative of allowing China to fall into chaos, until new forces arise to give it unity, is not a real alternative, since for good or ill this struggle in China takes place against the background of a great

world struggle. The alternative is not chaos but a victory for communism in China. While there is no evidence that Russia is giving the Chinese communists financial or military assistance, it is not quite realistic to believe that the Chinese communists are mild land-reformists whose victory would not affect the power-political struggle of the world. The Chinese communists probably agree as little with the dogmatic collectivism of the Russian land program as Tito does. But such deviations are not too important in the ultimate instance. A victory for Chinese communism is, on the whole, a victory for world communism under the Russian hegemony.

This fact makes it terribly difficult to sit by with folded hands. Yet we may have to learn to fold our hands. What is the value of acting resolutely when action is worse than inaction? Can we give support to a corrupt government without further discrediting it and without increasing its disposition to corruption? Is not the real pathos of the present situation that reliance upon American support has prevented the government from putting its house in order?

The French Dilemma

There are many reasons why France is threatened with a Gaullist form of dictatorship. The democratic middle ground is too weak to withstand the pressure from communism on the left and Gaullism on the right. It is weak partly because it exists primarily by the fear of both forms of dictatorship and lacks a positive program. It lacks a positive program partly because its socialist and Catholic wings have been unable to resolve the age-old conflict between Marxism and Christianity. These reasons have been previously discussed in these pages.

The democratic middle is weak also because both DeGaulle and the communists try to make it appear that the middle parties are allowing Britain and America to build up Germany at the expense of France. Actually we are insisting that there can be no European recovery if the economic re-

sources of the Ruhr are not fully exploited. We are unwilling to bow to the French fear of a powerful Germany. We regard such fears as natural enough; but we also know them to be pathetic. We are quite willing to take every precaution to prevent a powerful Germany from becoming a threat to Europe. But we cannot allow France to maim the German economic power if that means permanent economic stagnation in Europe. Nor can we allow a type of international control of the Ruhr which would be tantamount to a French control and which would breed endless difficulties. We can not, furthermore, follow DeGaulle's military suggestion which would, in effect, make France the military arbitrator of continental destiny, with Britain relegated to the Mediterranean and the United States to the Pacific, but with our own nation footing the bill of French military power.

The French national pride, which De Gaulle articulates in most explicit terms and which the communists obliquely encourage, is a symptom of a glaring national weakness. The French pride is extravagant partly because it is a wounded pride. The French know, though they are only partly conscious of knowing, that they capitulated too easily to Nazism. They are trying to eradicate Vichyism from their souls by their tantrums. This is not the only case in history where an unconfessed and unshrived guilt has led to new forms of evil.

The democratic middle ground is helpless against its critics because it is unable to challenge explicitly the mania which produces the criticisms. It is itself sufficiently obsessed with past perils and errors to be unable to espouse a creative policy in Europe on its merits. Consequently its actions in complying with Anglo-American policy appear to be nothing but the display of weakness. It has furthermore been unable to develop a creative domestic policy which would stop the inflationary spiral and give some security to the French workers.

For these reasons there is a real danger that France may become the weakest point

in the dike of democracy against totalitarianism. This does not mean that communism is an imminent peril for France. The immediate peril is a dictatorship of the right, which will force the confused socialists into the arms of communism. The deepest pathos lies in the fact that an ally, potentially so unreliable, should have the ambition to become the keystone of western defence. If France could recognise its weaknesses a little more honestly, it might still become strong.

Our Uneasy Peace

A group of high-minded students of foreign affairs recently sat down together to survey the international situation and ask the question: Is it possible to break the present stalemate in foreign policy and give a new creative impulse for the solution of the impasse between Russia and the west? The presupposition which united all participants was that though our foreign policy was just, as compared with that of Russia, it was not as just as it pretended to be. It was recognized, for instance, that the Baruch proposals for the control of atomic energy were not quite so unexceptional as usually assumed. It was hardly realistic to expect the Russians to accept the abolition of the veto on all matters pertaining to atomic energy. It ought to have been sufficient to abolish the veto only on the most ultimate questions. But this defect in the Baruch proposals, not unnoticed at the time they were made, was completely obscured by the fact that the Russian counter-proposals were so completely irrelevant that it was not possible to continue the negotiations.

It may be that the Berlin negotiations are in the same case. We may be wrong in insisting that we will not negotiate on the Berlin situation until the blockade is lifted. But it is so certain that the Russians do not really want to come to terms on Berlin that it seems pointless to try to correct the defect in American policy. So at least it seemed to the conferees. At every point the hope that a generous admission of error on

our part might lead to a new possibility of negotiation was dashed when Russian policy was closely analyzed. For it became apparent, on closer scrutiny, that the Russians would merely use such a gesture to challenge our prestige in Europe and to confuse our allies with the rumour that we were preparing to sacrifice them. If it is true that Truman's abortive effort to send Chief Justice Vinson to Moscow was actually prompted by a hint from Stalin that such a visit would be welcome, that fact would fit nicely into the general pattern which an honest analysis of the total situation reveals. For if the visit had been made, the position we had taken at Paris would have been undermined and the confidence of our European allies shaken beyond repair.

Such a situation is a desperate one. Ideally it ought to be possible to break an impasse by new ventures of faith. It is morally embarrassing to do nothing but stand firm. We can not possibly be so completely in the right as to warrant such intransigence. The real fact is, however, that the Russians will not yield an inch at any point, no matter what gestures we make, for the simple reason that they still have good hope of conquering Europe politically. The democratic front in both Italy and France is weak enough to encourage this Russian hope. Therefore our only hope lies in a continued economic, political, and moral convalescence of western Europe. The hope for that is not too bright; but there is no alternative hope. It is difficult for our generation to believe that a situation can be as desperate as such an analysis proves it to be. That is why all kinds of impossible alternatives are dreamed up.

Perhaps the only alternative to present policies lies in a frank organization of the whole democratic world on a higher level of economic, political, and military organization in order to bring the hegemony of America under greater democratic control and to increase the mutual cooperation of all nations interested in the defence of their liberties. A western European union will not do because western Europe is neither an economic unity nor a political

power. A western European union does not help to regulate the relation of American power to European weakness; nor does it help to bring Britain into effective relation with Europe. For Britain is rightfully concerned with both her continental and her Commonwealth relations and can not be forced to choose between them. Only something much larger than a western European union can serve the necessities of the western world.

What is Justice?

The war trials in Tokyo and Nuremberg continue, like some morning echo of last night's nightmare. In Tokyo they have just condemned six of the war leaders, including Tojo, to die. No one in Japan seemed concerned about the sentence of Tojo; but the audience in the chamber whispered "Hard! Hard!" on hearing the other sentences.

The "war criminals" who were guilty of various forms of cruelty no doubt deserved the punishment meted out to them. Those who were indicted and convicted of plotting an "aggressive war" stand in a different case. The whole idea of trying national leaders of a defeated nation on the charge of aggression is a project which only the pride of victors could have dictated. This does not mean that the accused may not have been guilty of plotting a war-like attack. But in the absence of a genuine international community, who is to determine what distinguishes an aggressive from a defensive war? If the victors set themselves up as judges, the vanquished will react with cynical contempt. They will regard the verdict as proving merely that the culprits lost the war. One can well imagine that wholly discredited war leaders in Japan will regain a certain measure of sympathy by achieving the position of national martyrs.

We have left some important dimensions

of justice out of account in this whole procedure. We have forgotten that a court sentence must not merely be inherently just but must proceed from a tribunal which has a prestige for justice. That prestige is of course primarily derived from the guarantees of impartiality in the structure of the juridical institution. If the court rests upon a partial interest, its sentence will not be accepted as just, even if it should rise above the prejudices of the group which it represents.

Actually the vanquished nations might have accepted a death sentence, executed on Tojo in hot blood in the hour of victory, as more just than this belated sentence, ground out years after the war's end. It would have belonged to the passions of the war. The present sentence pretends to belong to the measured wisdom of peace; but it can not disguise the pride of the victors which dictates it. It is merely a special case of the old sin of man, his inclination to play the part of God.

Furthermore the sentences reveal the inability of men and of nations to gauge the limits of justice in overcoming evil. Evil must of course be punished. But punitive justice has only a limited efficacy either in deterring from future crime or in changing the heart of the criminal. Forgiveness without punitive justice denegates into sentimentality. But punitive justice without forgiveness becomes abortive. This is the more true in the relation of nations to each other because they can not rise to a genuinely impartial justice. If they pretend to an impossible impartiality, they rob the justice of which they are capable of its redemptive power. Nations as such know nothing of a Gospel of forgiveness. They are by nature self-righteous and vindictive. Yet one might have hoped that they could at least have touched the fringes of the mystery of the relation of forgiveness to punishment.

LABOR AND POLITICS IN THE COMING PERIOD

By WILL HERBERG

The results of the elections, utterly unexpected though they were, have not affected one conclusion that was apparent long before November 2: *the year 1948 marks the end of an era in American labor politics*. The period that opened in 1933 with the inauguration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt has come to a close. Despite the important share it had in the recent Democratic victory, organized labor will not be able simply to continue its fifteen-year-old pattern of political strategy. Sooner or later, American labor will have to reorient itself politically, whether it wants to or not, whether it is prepared to do so or not. And the form this reorientation will take is bound to have important consequences for the structure of American policies as well as for the course of labor development in the coming period. Those of us whose theological outlook requires that we take the labor movement and contemporary history seriously will do well to study the present situation carefully and see at what point, if anywhere, our own action might prove effective.

I. *The New Deal: Social Policy and Politics*

By the middle of 1933, it was already apparent that the Roosevelt victory of the year before had not been just another election victory but was an event that was bound to prove of enduring significance to the nation and to the labor movement. The impact of the depression had upset the political habits and loyalties of large masses of Americans, more particularly of large masses of American workers; a violent revulsion had set in against "Hooverism." The Democratic landside of 1932 was the result. In this fluid, unsettled, even critical situation, the new Administration struck out on a line of which the Democratic pla-

form or the past record and campaign speeches of the Democratic candidate had given but little inkling. Once in office, Mr. Roosevelt revealed or—as some say with a great deal of plausibility—began to improvise his program. The New Deal was launched. The New Deal reflected a recognition of the fact that a bold, far-reaching *social policy* and vigorous action had become "*good politics*"—indeed, perhaps the only possible "politics" in the crisis. In a relatively short time, a comprehensive program including the NRA, collective bargaining, unemployment and work relief, federal social security, bank deposit insurance, TVA public power development, securities and exchange control, AAA farm aid and wage-hour regulation, was rushed through a willing Congress. Within a few months, the United States, hitherto one of the most backward of modern nations in this respect, achieved front rank in labor and social-welfare legislation. Some of it, notably the NRA, was later disallowed by the Supreme Court and was replaced by more or less adequate substitutes. By 1938, following a series of favorable decisions by the high court, this basic legislation, in its main outlines, had become part of the established order, largely beyond the reach of the shifting fortunes of party politics. The New Deal had completed its great historical task.

For organized labor, the sudden new departure in federal social policy proved most fateful. For the first time,¹ trade unions in America were not simply tolerated but given public recognition—even a quasi-public status. Section 7a of the NRA and

¹ A measure of official recognition was granted the unions during World War I but it did not survive the post-war reaction. Organized labor fell to a low point in numbers and influence during the late 1920's.

later the Wagner Act transformed them from merely private associations into semi-public agencies equipped with a considerable measure of governmental power. On the one hand, the government undertook to enforce collective bargaining by requiring employers to negotiate with the properly chosen representatives of the workers; on the other hand, it assumed the responsibility of determining the appropriate units of collective bargaining and of requiring workers, whatever their preference, to be represented by the bargaining agencies officially designated. The federal government thus became the coercive power behind collective bargaining both as against the employers and as against minority groups and individuals among the workers. Organized labor, leaders and members alike, were too delighted at the turn of events to give much thought to the fundamental implications of the new role of the government and the new status of the trade unions.

Simultaneously, startling changes were taking place in the party structure of American politics. Nationally, the major political parties, both Republican and Democratic, had hitherto been little more than loose federations of state, local and municipal machines run on the familiar principles of patronage politics. The party national committees had important functions and considerable influence but little ultimate power in the party organization. Roosevelt very quickly changed all that. It is now clear that from the very beginning of his administration he set about creating a new type of national political machine that would be beyond and above the older party structure. It was a machine centered in the White House, operating through the mushrooming recovery and social-welfare agencies of the New Deal. Where necessary, it could challenge the local party bosses and force them into line, for the resources which this White House organization had at its disposal were enormous—and by resources I mean not only finances but also voting strength and political appeal. Franklin Delano Roosevelt was too much the master politician to depend

simply on his social policy or his “fire-side” manner; these may have provided the steam but the White House-centered apparatus constituted the engine in one of the most amazing and most effective pieces of political machinery that American history has to show. Into this new political machine, organized labor—the trade unions—entered as a vital part.

The integration of the trade unions into the New Deal apparatus occurred so “naturally” that only the most detached observers took adequate note of it. The New Deal and the encouragement it gave to collective bargaining brought an immense upsurge, a veritable rebirth, of the trade-union movement. Not only was there a huge increase in numbers—the entire body of organized labor amounted to less than 3,000,000 in 1933; it is now well over 15,000,000. What is perhaps more important, the organized labor movement, for the first time in American history, penetrated the great basic, mass-production industries of the country—steel, automobile, electrical manufacture, rubber, oil, etc. American trade unionism was transformed almost overnight from a small and waning body of workers limited to the peripheral areas of the American economy into a powerful, expanding movement, reaching into the heart of the nation’s industrial life. Trade unionism, too, became officially recognized by the government and by a large part of the public as a “standard” American institution, as an integral part of the “American way of life”; big business may have had its reservations but for the time being these reservations did not seem to loom large.

The other side of this picture was the vast expansion of governmental control over labor and industry. The federal government became the most decisive factor in industrial relations. Collective bargaining assumed a new and rather portentous aspect: it no longer centered around union-management negotiations; it rapidly became a matter of proper representation before various governmental agencies. A new type of trade-union functionary made his appearance: the lawyer-specialist who

knew how to get things done in Washington. All of these developments, which began with the very initiation of the New Deal in 1933, were immensely speeded up by the pressures of war.

As I have said, the labor movement, both AFL and CIO—the split took place, it will be remembered, in 1935—very early became part of the New Deal political machine. The unions, which before 1932 had been so reluctant about political action, threw themselves unreservedly into politics; to all intents and purposes, they became *political auxiliaries*. This unprecedented development was greatly facilitated by the immense popularity Roosevelt enjoyed among the masses of the workers. Indeed, as more than one observer noted, it was Roosevelt who was the real political leader of labor, even where the union leaders continued to exert great power and influence in industrial matters. John L. Lewis, despite his high prestige among the coal miners, did not carry them along with him when he turned against Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944. The miners remained with Roosevelt and so did the great majority of other organized workers and their unions throughout the country.

What all this added up to was the virtual abandonment of the traditional *bi*-partisan (usually called “non-partisan”) policy of the American labor movement, according to which labor was not to tie itself to either of the old parties but was to “reward its friends and punish its enemies” in both of them. For good or ill, labor now became part of the Roosevelt political machine; it gave up “for the duration” its freedom of decision in the major area of politics.

A subtle change began to be felt in the moral atmosphere of the labor movement. Labor—that is, the leaders of organized labor—began to see themselves as no longer an underprivileged group of outsiders, without position or standing; they were now “on the inside” of things, a power in the land. With this new attitude came increasing self-confidence but also a certain arrogance. The heady effects of new-won power began to show themselves: blind self-

will, a reckless disregard of public opinion, an indifferent, even contemptuous unconcern for the sentiment of the farmers and other middle-class groups among the American people. It is not necessary to mention names, although Lewis, Petrillo, and certain leaders among the Teamsters immediately come to mind.

In an astonishingly short time, “Big Labor” began to replace “Big Business” as the horrible example of private monopoly in the popular imagination. This was not an entirely spontaneous development of public opinion, of course; it was helped along quite considerably by the paid propagandists of big business. Yet it cannot be denied that many leaders of organized labor, by adopting the old irresponsible “robber baron” attitude of “the public be damned” played right into the hands of this propaganda. The leadership of the AFL and the CIO simply refused to do anything about the gross abuses rife within labor’s ranks: bureaucracy and racketeering in the AFL; communism and reckless, irresponsible tactics in the CIO. They obstinately refused to recognize the implications of the new quasi-public status of the unions; they kept on talking as if the labor organizations were still voluntary, private associations of no concern to the public and with no relation to the government.² Every proposal for bringing fundamental labor legislation into line with the real position of labor met with blank rejection in official labor quarters. The old theory of “voluntarism,” which had served Gompers as an effective philosophy of labor in the early days of the movement, now became a veritable ideology masking the refusal of large parts of the labor leadership to face their social responsibilities, in very much the same way as the old doctrine of “laissez faire” has become the ideology of monopolistic big business.

All this may help to explain why the revulsion of popular feeling that set in with the end of the war was so easily directed against labor. The collapse of the New

² See Will Herberg, “Bureaucracy and Democracy in Labor Unions”, *Antioch Review*, Fall, 1943.

Deal, in social policy as well as in politics, actually began in 1938 but the war hid the catastrophe for a time. With the post-war reaction in public sentiment, with the new stampede toward "normalcy"—compounded of war weariness, resentment at governmental bureaucracy, and skillful propaganda—the tide turned against labor as well. The open-shop big-business interests that had long awaited and prepared for this hour now had their innings: a deluge of anti-labor legislation flooded the country, inundating a number of state capitals and then moving on to Washington. The Taft-Hartley Act—not the "slave" bill certain labor leaders have hysterically branded it but a very bad piece of legislation nevertheless—was the most significant result of this drive. The wheel thus completed its circuit: labor was in the "doghouse" again—but with a difference. Things had not returned to their pre-1933 status and never could: the main features of the New Deal still remained and the federal government was more than ever, in peacetime at least, the decisive factor in industrial relations.

In the recent elections, labor—by and large and after much hesitation—continued to support the Democratic candidate. The qualifying phrases are important. The very fact that there could be any question in the matter shows how far things had moved from the days of Roosevelt. The truth is that what kept labor to Truman was not so much Truman himself as the Taft-Hartley Act—and not so much the Taft-Hartley Act as the well justified fear of worse to come should the Republicans succeed in tightening their grip on Washington. Clearly, the labor campaign for Truman was something very different from the old familiar pro-Roosevelt pattern. Everyone felt that November 2 would somehow, in some way, mark the end of an epoch.

II. Prospects and Possibilities for the Coming Period

Despite appearances to the contrary, the unexpected outcome of the elections has not radically changed the situation. The

problem for the labor movement remains essentially the same as it would have been had Dewey been elected. The answer, however, especially the answer cast in immediate terms, will in many ways be quite different.

The Truman victory will not reconstitute the Democrat party on the old New Deal basis. A surface appearance of unity will naturally characterize the triumphant party, so unexpectedly returned to power. But the coalition of Southern reactionaries, big-city machines and organized labor, which Roosevelt welded and kept together with such care, has fallen apart and can not be restored. The disruptive forces come from deep below the surface and it will take more than Mr. Truman, for all his new-won prestige, to keep them under control.

As soon as the tumult and shouting die down, organized labor will realize that even with the Democrats in power, things will never be quite the same as they were a decade ago. Despite appearances, labor has lost its long-time political home; it can no longer count on a secure existence as the political auxiliary of New Deal Democracy. Labor leaders will have to make some decision, will have to outline some new course, however tentative, and that without too much delay.

What are the possibilities of political orientation on the part of labor? Traditionally, there have been three major types of labor political action:

1. *Lobbying* through legislative representatives in the state capitals and in Washington. This is a kind of steady day-to-day work that continues whatever the turns of politics. It brings its results, such as they are, but it is clearly not something that can take in labor's entire activity on the political front.

2. *Bi-partisan pressure politics*. This has been called "collective bargaining in politics" for it consists primarily in a promise to throw the "labor vote" in support of candidates who prove friendly to organized labor and a threat to withdraw it from those who are hostile. Pressure politics may be

occasional and haphazard, as it has been largely in the AFL, or it may be continuous and streamlined, as the CIO has attempted to make it through its Political Action Committee (PAC).³ It may concentrate on primaries or elections or both, but however it works, its slogan is the traditional political formula of American labor, "Reward your friends and punish your enemies."

3. *Independent party.* Labor unions may federate or otherwise join together to help form an independent party of their own, as they have done with notable success in Britain. In this country, the only recent examples of importance of this advanced form of political action have been on a statewide rather than national scale—the earlier American Labor party⁴ and the present Liberal party in New York. In both cases, the independence has been almost entirely limited to independence of party organization; the candidates endorsed have mostly been taken from the old parties. The year 1924, when LaFollette and Wheeler ran as banner-bearers of a third party with official labor support, still remains the high-water mark of independent labor politics in this country.

Keeping this general picture in mind, what are the possibilities and prospects of the coming period? That, for all the official jubilation over Mr. Truman's reelection, there is a certain revulsion in labor's ranks against politics, a certain tendency to revert to a pre-Roosevelt political passivity, cannot, I think, be denied. But this attitude, though in many ways understandable, is ultimately impossible. The nation will never again return to the condition before the New Deal when the federal government was a minor factor in industrial relations. For the past thirteen years, since the validation of the Wagner Act and similar legislation, it has been a

major factor—perhaps *the* major factor—and it will almost certainly remain so. The Taft-Hartley Act, despite all the assurances of Congressional demagogues, has thrust the federal government deeper into industrial relations rather than taken it out. In mere self-defense, therefore, if for no other reason, the labor movement will have to continue in politics. No withdrawal is possible.

Unquestionably, the overwhelming opinion in labor circles at the moment is for a return to active bi-partisan pressure politics in an up-to-date streamlined form, modelled along the CIO's PAC or the AFL's Labor's League for Political Education. So distinguished a student of the labor movement as Professor Selig Perlman of Wisconsin regards this type of labor action as the most effective under present-day American conditions,⁵ but many observers are convinced that the presuppositions and mechanics of American party politics set definite and rather narrow limits to the possibilities of labor action under the bi-partisan system. Their point may be obscured but it is not invalidated by the recent Democratic victory. The Democratic party is no nearer to becoming a vehicle of labor's aspirations and the prospect of labor's becoming a really *decisive* influence in either of the old parties seems as remote as ever.

Nevertheless it must be recognized that Mr. Truman's sensational victory has, for the time being at least, put a stop to the talk that was beginning to be heard in labor circles about going beyond the bi-partisan policy to form an independent party based upon organized labor. When I spoke on this subject at the Fellowship conference towards the middle of October 1948, it seems to me that there was a genuine possibility of some action in the not too distant future. Responsible spokesmen of labor groups—including Walter Reuther

³ The PAC, an agency of the CIO, is not to be confused with the PCA (Progressive Citizens of America), the pro-Wallace organization.

⁴ In recent years, the ALP has functioned simply as a Communist front.

⁵ Selig Perlman, "Labor and Political Action," *Labor in the New Deal Decade*, pp. 28-36. (This work consists of three lectures delivered by Professor Perlman in December 1943 and January 1945 at the ILGWU Officers Institute in New York.)

of the CIO's United Automobile Workers, leaders of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and even President Green himself—had made statements that clearly suggested their belief that some new orientation looking in the direction of greater political independence was on the order of the day. There is very little such talk to be heard today. Yet I must repeat that the labor party issue has not been conjured out of existence—that, in some form, it will probably arise as an actual problem much sooner than many people at this moment believe. It would be well, therefore, to consider the question from a somewhat broader perspective than the immediate post-election situation.

There are those whose opposition to the labor party idea is not based on any momentary political constellation. Professor Perlman, for example, believes that independent political organization on the part of labor and allied forces would drain the leaven of liberalism from the two big parties and would leave them uncontested in the hands of reactionaries. Affirming that this is "basically a very conservative country, a country in which the labor movement lives in a rather hostile environment," he holds that "such a realignment in our political life would really operate to enthrone the conservatives in power forever."⁶ Others stress the dangers of political fragmentation attendant upon the breakup of the traditional two-party system, which they regard as the bulwark of domestic stability.

It would be foolish to deny that there is real force to these arguments. Yet they cannot add up to a final refutation of the labor party idea since they ignore the fundamental consideration on the other side—the inherent futility of pressure politics regarded from any but the most short-range point of view. If labor is to do anything serious in politics, it must somehow go beyond the very narrow limits of the old-time bi-partisan strategy.

It is my conviction that despite all the problems, dangers, and difficulties it would

involve, the launching of a broad-based labor-liberal party in this country would constitute a definite service both to the labor movement and to the nation. For labor it would open possibilities of political effectiveness beyond what even the best pressure politics can offer. For the nation as a whole, it would provide a way out of the present political impasse which makes ordinary American politics appear to be a senseless game pursued by professional machine politicians for their own advantage; who can doubt that this condition has contributed greatly to the apathy and cynicism about politics so widespread among the American people? Some way of relating politics—*everyday* politics and not merely exciting presidential elections—to issues of more direct concern to the masses of the people than the patronage of politicians must be found if American democracy is to retain its vitality in these times, and it seems to me that the realignment of politics through the formation of a nationwide labor-liberal party would best accomplish this end.

Granted that such a realignment—the breaking up of the two-party status-quo—in politics is desirable, a number of questions arise, answers to which would constitute criteria for our judgment of the practical significance and effectiveness of any new party movement that may appear in the foreseeable future.

1. Could such a party win the masses of the workers or a sufficiently large proportion of them to make it a serious force in politics? No one can really answer this question because no one really knows whether there is a "labor vote" in this country and how big it is.⁷ That there are millions of workers, union men and women, who go to the polls and vote is obvious, but do they vote in line with official views of their organizations and the appeals of their leaders?

⁷ The question certainly cannot be answered by pointing to the insignificant showing made by Henry Wallace in the recent elections. Mr. Wallace and his Communist-run party were completely repudiated by all sections of the labor movement, except for the few unions under direct Communist control.

⁶ Perlman, *op. cit.*, p. 3

This we do not know. From 1932 to 1944 rank and file and leaders alike were overwhelmingly pro-Roosevelt, so that the results of the elections in these years hardly constitute evidence of anything. On the other side, when Lewis opposed Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944, the miners continued to vote Democratic, but Lewis's action was so eccentric that this too constitutes no test. What the recent elections show in this matter is not yet clear, though there seem to be indications of a massed "labor vote" in certain industrial states.

As to sentiment for a labor party, responsible surveys conducted some two years ago would seem to suggest that a sizable section of the union membership—varying from about 25 to 50 percent—favor such a party "in principle"; the proportion is no smaller among union leaders, especially in the CIO.⁸ The question, however, cannot be answered on the basis of statistics gathered in reply to an academic query. The real answer will be forthcoming only when the attempt is actually made. If a sufficiently large part of the top and middle labor leadership support the move, I am convinced that an initiative for a new party would win suprisingly wide support among the masses of the workers. But of such an initiative there seems to be little prospect at the present time.

2. Could such a party bridge the AFL-CIO split? Clearly, it would have to do so if it is to amount to anything. Hitherto, despite a wide area of agreement, the two labor federations as well as such independent groups as the Machinists and the Railway Brotherhoods have had their own "political arms" operating each for itself. Conditions today appear much more favorable for a rapprochement and genuine co-operation.

3. Could such a party secure a place for those New Deal liberals who, like labor, have to find their way out of the debacle

of the Roosevelt party? They are among the original New Dealers; many of them were important executives, administrators and policy-making officials in the early "heroic" days of the Roosevelt Administration. Some have come back to elective office in the sweep of the Democratic victory, but basically their position has not changed; they are still, as someone has aptly called them, a "government in exile." At present, these liberals are mostly to be found in or around the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). The ADA, in its brief career, has achieved the distinction of being the only organization of its kind in recent memory that really has good connections and influence in labor circles. It is at present animated with a renewed hope of capturing the Democratic party but it is not likely that this hope will survive the realities of the coming period. At any rate, it is hard to imagine any significant labor-liberal party movement launched under present conditions without the ADA in it as a vitalizing force.

4. Could such a new party bridge the chasm between labor and the middle classes and farmers? In a real sense, this is the decisive question. A new party movement launched by labor without regard to, or against, the farmers and other sections of the middle class would be worse than nothing, for it would only deepen labor's dangerous isolation from the rest of the American people. American trade unionism has in the past shown little capacity to gain the confidence of, or even to approach, the middle-class groups. This has not been all labor's fault; there are deep-rooted objective factors making for a certain divergence of attitude and interest.⁹ But it cannot be denied that the narrowness of outlook so characteristic of many trade-union leaders, their tendency to think in terms of immediate interest rather than of long-term benefit, has considerably aggravated the situation. The problem of inflation—today the central problem of do-

⁸See C. Wright Mills, *The New Men of Power*, pp. 179-181 (on the "Labor Vote"), pp. 201-219 ("Old Parties, New Parties").

⁹ Perlman, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-14.

mestic policy—is an example.¹⁰ A new departure in labor politics is conceivable only on the basis of a new departure in labor policy towards the middle class groups that constitute so important a part of the nation.

III. *Tasks of the Fellowship*

There is clearly little prospect of any labor party arising in this country in the immediate future. Yet in a fundamental sense, the question remains on the order of the day, and it seems to me that every genuine move toward such a party deserves to be welcomed and supported by the Fellowship. Certainly, should a serious movement be launched, it will be for members of the Fellowship to take an active part in it as citizens and as men and women concerned with social reconstruction. The organized workers, we all believe, play a crucial part in the struggle for democracy and social justice. "Labor is more likely than any of the other special-interest groups in our society to be on the side of equality and freedom," we state in our program, and to this we attribute labor's special vocation in the present-day world. Surely this view is as relevant to the efforts labor may come to make on the political field as it is to what labor is doing in the economic sphere. Members of the fellowship ought

not to overlook any opportunity that may arise of taking significant part in a developing new party movement and, from inside the movement, contributing their share not only to working out its general philosophy but also to helping it reach the middle classes. For the latter task, I believe, the members of the Fellowship are particularly fitted, for, as religious socialists and professional men themselves, they stand, as it were, "at the boundary" between the professional and middle class groups, on the one hand, and the labor movement, on the other, and are thus in a position to mediate between them.

Members of the Fellowship, I think, should do what they can to promote the labor-liberal party movement and take active part in it, when and if it develops. But whatever we do, we should do *critically*, independently, without abandoning our fundamental standpoint, which makes for a certain valuable detachment and objectivity. Labor needs friends but it needs friends not flatterers, not those who will ignore or gloss over its shortcomings. Labor needs friends who will stand with it in its fight to achieve a higher measure of economic and political justice, but it needs friends who will not hesitate to point out narrowness, shortsightedness, and injustice in its own ranks. Like Israel of old, labor needs not "comfortable words" but words of truth, *responsible* words. Those who have the sympathy and the courage to speak such words, while doing everything in their power to strengthen the labor movement and help it achieve its basic aims, which are also the aims of social justice in our society—they are the true friends of labor.

¹⁰ See the penetrating article by Eduard Heimann, "On Strikes and Wages", *Social Research*, March 1948.—"The current trend of public opinion against the aspirations of labor, which found resounding expression in the Taft-Hartley Act," Dr. Heimann states, "is a reaction not only to a number of avoidable abuses, which a wiser labor movement would long ago have suppressed but also to methods of labor strategy which long established, are assuming an entirely new significance in the changing structure of society."

THE INDUSTRIAL CHAPLAINCY: Problems and Prospects

By DONALD L. BENEDICT

In the past few years the Protestant Church has become increasingly concerned with industrial relations. This growth of interest in the problems of labor-management relations has led churchmen to explore new methods of witnessing to the Christian Faith at the focal point of the problem, i.e. the factory. In some cases ministers of various denominations have been assigned to minister to specific factories as chaplains. Their aim has been to be available for counseling with both employer and employee as well as to establish worship services in the plant at appropriate times. This has been the most orthodox approach to the industrial chaplaincy, but of course there have been distinct deviations from this "factory based" parish.

The church is concerned with labor management problems because beyond all of the technical matters involved there remains the question of justice with which the church has a primary concern. On the other hand the church (in the case of the major Protestant denominations) has been guilty of neglecting the people who are involved in this industrial conflict. Therefore, many Protestant leaders have felt that in order to influence the industrial situation the church must have contact with the men who work in the plants.

Granted that the church has an interest in industrial relations, what should be the duties of the industrial chaplain? The term chaplain usually suggests personal counseling and perhaps voluntary worship services. It is quite possible that both labor and management would be susceptible to this function, but the question immediately arises as to what extent the chaplain should engage in prophetic action and witness? If the chaplain took sides with either the union or management in a labor dispute,

would he not jeopardize his counseling relationship with both the employer and employees? On the other hand if he did not make an ethical judgment in the case of an industrial dispute, would he not be misrepresenting the Gospel? While it is true that the Gospel sheds no specific light directly upon such a dispute, the perfect love ethic of Jesus must be brought to bear constantly upon questions of relative justice which any industrial dispute raises. Therefore the industrial chaplain is constantly faced with the conflict between his "prophetic" and his "priestly" role. Needless to say there is no easy answer to this problem.

For this brief analysis of the industrial chaplaincy I have chosen three rather different attempts in the field which will more specifically reveal the problems involved. The first is the work of the Rev. Francis B. Sayre, Jr. in Cleveland, Ohio. Mr. Sayre is a clergyman in the Protestant Episcopal Church who in March 1946 was appointed Industrial Chaplain for the Diocese of Ohio. He was also appointed Priest-in-charge of St. Matthew's parish in Cleveland, Ohio.

Mr. Sayre's original prospectus on the industrial chaplaincy pointed out that the existing church strategy was not reaching the working class population. His experience as a chaplain in the War convinced him that large numbers of men had little or no Christian training. This condition he traced to the general apathy of the working people toward the church and to the ineffectual attempts of the church to reach these groups. Therefore he argued that the church must extend its ministry to the place where people work.

Mr. Sayre started by securing the support of the Ministerial Association in Cleveland, and later in Akron, and from time to

time he held conferences with church leaders in the area to keep them informed of his progress. They all seemed interested but held support in abeyance until they could see more tangible results.

He felt that it was necessary to get the financial support of both management and labor in the undertaking in order to be effective and to maintain his own religious independence.

He chose as his first plant one in which the policy making headquarters was locally situated. This was decided as a practical matter in order to reach the men who could make decisions for the company. Sayre made it clear to both labor and management that his job was to act as a moral bridge between the two groups and that he would not under any circumstances act as conciliator or mediator in a dispute. He says:—The chaplain “stands as a witness to the larger moral and religious obligations of all men and groups. In the measure that he makes this witness effective, disputes will be mitigated and even prevented, but no minister is expected to be qualified for the highly technical job of an arbitrator as that term is understood today.” Sayre thus believes that the chaplain should stand above the conflict and attempt in a preventive way to reduce the tension involved.

The actual results of this experiment have been disappointing. Sayre approached both union and management of the White Truck Company, which employs 4500 people. The collective bargaining agent for the workers in the plant is the United Automobile Workers, an affiliate of the CIO. He secured the cooperation of the company with little or no difficulty but the company was concerned that the idea should originate with the union rather than with the company. In this way they thought it would be more favorably received by the workers. After several conferences with labor leaders, he secured permission to present the plan to the shop stewards. They seemed genuinely interested, particularly those who had been in the armed forces and recognized the possibilities of the chap-

laincy. However, the president of the local refused to allow the matter to be brought before the membership, saying that he “feared the political consequences of any position that at some future time would develop.” It is not clear what he meant by this statement, but the matter was dropped, for without a vote no funds could be appropriated. Later word from Mr. Sayre indicates that a similar undertaking has also failed at the Firestone Rubber plant in Akron. The case study indicates some of the difficulties involved in attempting to establish an industrial chaplaincy in a plant when certain union officials fear political consequences. However, it is encouraging to hear very recently that Mr. Sayre is going ahead with another experiment in Northern Ohio.

The second case study illustrates another problem which frequently arises in establishing this sort of enterprise. The Rev. Claude Williams came to Detroit during the war when thousands of his fellow southerners were flocking to the war plants of that great metropolis. His work was supported by the Detroit Presbytery and the Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. His general thesis was that formal education and the general sophistication of the urban “middle class” is primarily responsible for the “liberal” view of the Bible and religion. For this reason he did not feel that the poorer classes felt at home in the church. He felt that the emotionalism and escapism of the sect groups which dealt with the “lower class” did not have to take such a pattern. He therefore attempted through the use of charts and lectures to educate lay ministers of the various sects to the belief that the scripture stands for social justice, against racism, and for the common man against his enemies. Many have testified that Mr. Williams did have some effect upon some of the store-front ministers, but several have raised questions about his sympathy for the Communist party. It might be noted that the “Institute for Applied Religion,” the name of Williams’ project, has been placed on the subversive list by the Depart-

ment of Justice. One would also raise questions about the use of the scripture as the possession of one class against another. Regardless of these objections, however, one must acknowledge that Mr. Williams attempted to work in areas where most of us fear to tread.

A third type of chaplaincy is illustrated by the much-publicized work of the Rev. Anthony Monteiro in the New Jersey industrial area where he has carried on work in eight factories for a period of four years. In 1943 Mr. Monteiro was working as a laborer in the Barnett Foundry and Machine Company in Irvington, New Jersey, when the president decided to institute Sunday work in order to increase war production. Monteiro, who at the time was taking courses at Bloomfield Theological Seminary felt that if the men worked every other Sunday they would never go to church. He therefore asked the President of the foundry to allow him to hold services in the plant on the Sundays that they were required to work. The President jumped at the idea and Monteiro's career started. In fact the president was so interested in the idea that he assisted Mr. Monteiro financially in the final year of his education.

Upon graduation from the seminary, Monteiro asked to begin a regular industrial chaplaincy in the plant, holding church services every month. The continuation of this work was more than acceptable to the president of the foundry, and seven other neighboring plants were added to the circuit.

Before telling of an interesting visit to one of the plants with Mr. Monteiro, I would like to enumerate some of the results which he claims have emerged from the experiment. First, the number of workers attending the service each month is unusually high. Second, there have been many cases of workers returning to their own churches after long absences. Third, both labor and management indicate that the work has helped with peaceful relations between both groups.

I recently visited with Mr. Monteiro and

accompanied him through one of the factories where he acts as chaplain. In talking with him I discovered his basic philosophy concerning labor disputes. He feels that if only people would all become Christians there would be no disputes between employer and employee.

We arrived at the factory about three-quarters of an hour before the time for the service, so we went in to visit with the President of the Foundry. As we walked into his office, I noticed his certificate of membership in the National Association of Manufacturers hanging on the wall. The president was quite an elderly man. As we talked he had nothing but praise to offer for the work of the Rev. Mr. Monteiro. The Barnett Foundry employs about 250 men, and it might be added here that none of the factories which Monteiro serves employs over 500 workers. This fact I believe has some effect upon the nature of his work, because it is conducive to a more personal relationship than in plants which hire thousands of workers and operate on a mass production basis. Foundry work of this type has always required more individual skill.

After our conference with the president we walked out through the foundry and Monteiro nodded and chatted with various men as we went through. He appeared to have established a definite rapport with them.

We went back to one end of the foundry where benches had been placed across a depressed area in the floor. At the one end of this area there was a pulpit made of ply wood and a cross placed on a small table. To the left of the pulpit Monteiro hung an American flag, which I learned later was his own idea. The service lasted for half an hour. The men contribute fifteen minutes of their time once every month and the company contributes fifteen minutes of the working time. The service was opened by prayer followed by the singing of several hymns. As I looked around the congregation, one of the encouraging things to witness was colored and white workers seated side by side just as they

work in the shop. It was indeed a stirring sight to see these men in their work clothes singing the hymns of the church.

After the hymns Mr. Monteiro preached a short sermon related directly to the article he had printed in the news sheet which he passes out every month. The general topic was "New Life." He told how men must be reborn again if they want to find a life free from selfishness and egotism of the spirit. At the end of the service he had all of the men stand and salute the flag instead of having a benediction. After the service I asked why he used the saluting of the flag to close the service. His only answer was that he thought there were probably communists in the congregation and he wanted to make sure that they continued to salute the flag.

The most revealing part of the service came when Monteiro asked the president to say a few words at the close of the service. The president, who had been seated in the front row during the service, rose to speak. He started by telling the men how well they had fared during the last six years of the era of high production. He reminded them that they had been working six days a week and sometimes even more than that. He pointed out that there might be more difficult times in the near future. He read from a trade journal telling of many foundries having to shut down two or three days a week because of lack of orders and lack of materials, especially steel. He said that the political situation looked even worse. There was a possibility that OPA would be brought back, which to his way of thinking was the worst law ever passed by congress. There can be no doubt that the men would naturally connect this political propaganda with the position of the church. I asked Monteiro about this later and he said that

this was the second time that the president had spoken. However, he did not seem at all disturbed about the matter.

Indications are that Mr. Monteiro himself is not fully aware of the way in which he may be serving the special purposes of this particular employer. This case study reveals one of the greatest dangers in this type of industrial chaplaincy, i.e. that the church will become identified with the particular interests of either the employer or the union. Any man undertaking such a chaplaincy would of necessity be schooled in the forces at work in our industrial structure.

While these three case studies do not provide adequate material for a full investigation of the industrial chaplaincy, I feel that they point to certain strengths and weaknesses as a Protestant strategy. On the positive side I would suggest three strengths. First, any attempt to bring the gospel to the unchurched factory worker is a step in the right direction. Second, the pastoral work done by these chaplains is of tremendous value to the workers and cannot be denied as a real contribution. Third, this approach can have very real effects upon the thinking of the church in general, because these chaplains will take their experiences back to their denominational councils.

On the other hand there are dangers and limitations in this approach. First, the prophetic element in the gospel is apt to be subordinated to such a degree that the church comes to be used as a bulwark for the *status quo*. Second, there is a danger that such an approach would contribute to the further atomization of our society in as much as the workers' families would not be drawn directly into the church program.

THE SOCIAL GROWTH OF AUSTRALIA

By HARRY P. REYNOLDS

I

At a census taken in June, 1946, the population of Australia, a single-nation continent, was 7,580,820. This made an increase of almost a million since the previous census was taken in 1933. In the post-war period births have risen to record levels, and an ambitious immigration policy is gradually being implemented. The war, which almost stopped immigration for six years, and an acute housing shortage, which has had an effect on marriages and births, have undoubtedly retarded the population growth of the Commonwealth.

Australians today are probably more population-conscious than ever before. For one hundred and sixty years they have possessed a continent the population potential of which has been estimated at between 20 and 50 millions. The troubled stirrings in the Asiatic countries to the north and the temptation to such countries of a sparsely settled continent are sources of growing anxiety. The White Australia policy, which, as one historian has written, "is the indispensable condition of every other Australian policy," is a mixture of racial and economic considerations. No political party would dare tamper with it, but thinking Australians realize that at the present it is a protection on paper only.

With a population at least ninety-eight per-cent Anglo-Saxon, the Commonwealth is an outpost of European civilization. Australia's traditions, in religion, social idealism, literature and art, have all stemmed from Europe. In a few things, notably in social thought and action, Australia has made independent progress, but in general she still looks mainly to Europe for guidance. (In recent years the influence of the U.S.A. has grown more marked.) She has depended largely upon Britain and the British assimilation of developments in the rest of Europe.

Yet for a long time Australia lagged badly behind Britain in thought and expression. Movements and phases that were important half a world away were sometimes scarcely felt in Australia. Occasionally they were strongly felt, but ludicrously late. An arbitrary official censorship of literature that from time to time clamped down on a well-known book only served to highlight the tardy cultural development of the Commonwealth. A Minister for Customs who banned James Joyce's *Ulysses* so that "the mind of the Australian school child might not be corrupted" was only mildly ridiculed. With easier communications, the pressure of Australia's participation in two world wars, and the development of an indigenous culture the lag is now not so great and is being overhauled. Gradually Australia is making a contribution to English letters, and in other directions an awakening has started. As yet we are only mildly interested in the arts and music, probably because in them the Australian is not yet clearly articulate in the things that he feels and knows best.

The only honest justification for the White Australia policy is that it need not imply an entirely negative attitude. There are millions of Europeans whose problems can never be solved on European soil, but whose basic interests will always remain European. If Australia desires, as she apparently does, to maintain a European, as distinct from an Asiatic or mixed, type of civilization she can do so to the mutual advantage of herself and these millions from Europe. That is, provided a real immigration policy is pursued more consistently and less as a plaything of politicians than in the past. It can be argued that such a course will help to ensure in this part of the world a balance of power that might make for peace.

Nevertheless, while the general attitude is

improving, Europeans are not always made as welcome as they have the right to expect. They are often treated years after they arrive as aliens and beggars, and frequently the more successful they are the more offensive their presence seems to be. In the past, one or two newspapers (there is a certain type of weekly that preaches an inflammatory and unintelligent nationalism) have described some Europeans as "semi-Asiatic," and even Anglo-Saxons have been regarded as of alien stock. Yet the more intelligent Australian realizes only too clearly that our need of all these people is at least as great as their need of a new country.

A measure of this suspicion and active dislike is based upon the Australian mistrust of European living conditions, class distinctions, and religious loyalties. It is felt that the new wine of Australian democracy, though not perfect, can never be held in the traditional European containers. Few Australians realize that men emigrate in hope, and that the majority of those who leave Europe do so with aspirations for the future similar to those that have been held by the pioneers of the Commonwealth's political and social development. They come looking for room to grow in freedom and self-respect.

Much of the attitude of many Australians, however, is due to the Commonwealth's comparative isolation from world affairs and a consequent insular spirit. Europe is regarded as a place where the world's problems, including wars, are fomented, and every European is held to be about equally guilty. This childish attitude has had an effect in the past on governmental policy in immigration, but it seems now that the Commonwealth government, realizing Australia's need of a greater population, is determined to bring in migrants as quickly as it can. This wise lead is doing much to destroy prejudices.

II

It is a problem for an Australian to try and present a clear picture of the political and social life of his own nation. The

factors most important for others to see can easily be taken for granted by one to whom these things are commonplace.

Yet judging by what one reads and hears of the U.S.A. there are radical differences between the American and Australian set-up. As a general example, the seemingly ruthless and brutal treatment often received by American labor in its dealings with employers is something that the Australian worker, conscious of the political and industrial solidarity and strength of his own class at home, finds hard to understand. He takes for granted the powerful political organization of Australian labor, even if he sometimes overestimates the advantages.

Another thing that puzzles the Australian is the flaunting and the apparent popular worship of immense private fortunes in the U.S.A. Australia has a few rich men, but in a different atmosphere they remain comparatively coy, fearing, perhaps, the reverse of popular enthusiasm should they parade their wealth. The main trend of Australian economic legislation has been in the direction of a levelling process, and the worker likes to believe in its success. Free enterprise as it is apparently understood in America, though it may recall past bitterness, is now fairly stale on the social palate of the bulk of Australians. To gain many advantages in living conditions the Australian has let free enterprise be mauled by the lions of government paternalism, but, despite shrill and angry cries of "socialism" that arise from time to time, to nowhere near the point of death.

Geographically and politically Australia is a federation of six States. Apart from the States there are the largely undeveloped Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, of Canberra and its environs, both of which are administered directly by the Commonwealth government. Federation was achieved on January 1st, 1901. Each State still has its own parliament, and each legislature has gradually become subservient to Federal politics. War emergency legislation enforced at Canberra tightened the over-all control of the

States by the Commonwealth, and there are signs that the more important part of this legislation is to remain in force. Despite the fact that Australians depend upon their State governments for a great deal there are no widespread regrets for their diminishing influence. It was apparently generally believed in 1901 that the nation's vote for federation would result in the abolition of the State parliaments. Australians have had a feeling for forty-odd years that seven parliaments for a few million people were six too many.

The political structure of the nation is basically simple. In the Commonwealth sphere and in the States there is a Labor Party opposed by one or two non-Labor parties. The Labor Party has stuck to the one label everywhere and always. The opposition parties sometimes have different labels for the different parliaments, and often these labels are changed from time to time.

In its essential character the Labor Party is a product of trade unionism, which has been a growing part of Australian life for over a century. One out of seven Australians was a trade unionist in 1927. The conditions favorable to the growth of trade unionism have been so evident since then that the proportions must be much higher today. The Labor Party, which naturally has a strong interest in the development of the trade unions, has had many terms in office since 1927, while both the economic depression preceding the war and the war itself added to the number of trade unionists.

Political Labor was born in 1891, when thirty-six Labor men were elected to the New South Wales parliament. (N.S.W. has always led the other States in politics.) Since then the fortunes of Labor have varied as they will with any political party, but whether in or out of office the Labor Party has always been a tightly organized and powerful force. Its strength has rested upon its ability to blend idealism and opportunism in political action. The aims of the party are collectivist, but in the main its effective policies have been reformist. Not

all trade unionists support the ideal of collectivism and in any case before the Labor Party can govern it must win support from other classes, such as farmers and small business men. As a result, it is usually the votes of these other classes that fix the values of Labor policy, so that in the pure sense they cease to be Labor values. The vote of the average trade unionist can be relied upon; therefore it counts for less with the party than that of those sections whose vote must be wooed by specific promises. It is here that disillusionment awaits the man who joins the Labor Party with the idea of helping to carry out the basic policies of Labor.

Thus, despite the fact that eighty per cent of the Australian electorate has a firm belief in the distinctive values behind the labels, Labor policies today are barely distinguishable from those of the opposition parties. On both sides the policies, broadly, merge into the democratic temper of Australian traditions. Yet, to be just, the credit for most of these traditions belongs to Labor. When in power in normal times the opposition parties, even though backed by the employing classes and all the political weapons that money can buy, must shape their policies to somewhere near the standards set by Labor. If a party will not govern for the workers it finds it almost impossible to govern against them. Any attempt to do so usually results in union action and a strong reminder that Labor is well equipped to take advantage of a swing of the political pendulum.

On the other hand, the Labor Party in achieving so many of its early objectives has lost the sense of purpose and the zest that it once had. In its prime it expressed a radical and wholesome Australian nationalism, based upon a conception of the mateship of the common man. Now the party machine is controlled by men who put political victories above new ideals of social righteousness. It is the old story of power corrupting idealism and weakening purpose. Now and again a radical minority forces its will upon the machine, but its triumphs are usually brief. The plea of

political expediency is generally an effective counter with the rank and file. Labor politicians still call themselves socialists, but always in the places where it will do them least political harm.

Today the Labor Party holds office in the Commonwealth Parliament and in four States. Before long the Australian people will probably turn to the opposition parties, if only to show Labor that they believe that in itself a change is a good thing.

III

For the worker the three main features of Australian industry are trade unionism, the Arbitration Courts, and the basic, or minimum wage. Each deserves a more careful examination than is possible here.

The trade unions often find it necessary to hasten by direct action the slow legal processes of arbitration. Direct action is illegal, but the solidarity of the unions usually ensures immunity from the law and some degree of success. In fairness to the unions it appears that the decisions of the Arbitration Courts, apart from the irritating time-lag factor, favor the employer too often. While industrial arbitration has been responsible for many improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions, more has been achieved, directly and indirectly, by strong union action. For that reason the unions still maintain the worker's right to strike or to take any other direct action considered necessary and justified, the law apart.

The basic wage is fixed from time to time by an absurd system of calculating the bare needs of a worker and his family. In normal times the basic wage counts for little, except to bring into greater contempt the entire system that a capitalist-industrial society has evolved to deal with its workers. While there is a free flow of business few Australians receive the bare basic wage. Extra rates of pay for all kinds of things are added to it. Some years ago the Commonwealth Arbitration Court at one sitting awarded no less than 200 "margins for skill" in the timber industry alone. Pay "loadings" are also granted for dangerous

work, poor or bad conditions, and inconvenience caused to workers by the nature of their job. It is when times are bad that the basic wage becomes a bastion, even though it may be revised to a lower level, providing the worker can find a job.

In an impressive list of social services, increasing in number and in their disbursement of money, the Australian worker has made other gains over the years. These include unemployment and sickness benefits; invalid, old age, and widows' pensions; maternity allowances; and child endowment. For the financial year 1946-47 the amount spent by the Commonwealth on social services was almost 60 million pounds, a record figure. Since then a general increase has been made in the amounts payable, so that the figure will be much greater in the future. Always providing, of course, that Australia's exports remain as marketable and as valuable as they are today.

IV

The great majority of Australians have grown into a humanistic philosophy. The understanding and practice of Christianity is relatively unimportant beside the pursuit of material benefits and diversions. This is not written censoriously of the many. In the main the churches have failed to direct the Christian dynamic down the main roads of Australian life. For the missing fellowship of the faith the Australian has substituted the gospel of materialism, which was passionately preached and accepted when trade unionism was coming into its own. It flowered in some of the finest of Australian literature at a time when the distinctive Australian was engaged in a ceaseless battle with drought, fire, flood, and with man-made conditions equally discouraging. The struggle was so continuous and so much a matter of daily bread that the struggle itself and not the end became supreme. Nature was seen as eternally capricious and brutally impersonal in her dealings with man, but she seldom appeared mysterious or beckoning. The supernatural was squeezed out in the endless grind of

living, and often just living at that. There never came any deep conviction that the brotherhood of man is "in Heaven." Here and now was all-important in the shaping of a destiny, and a mate was a finer thing than a dim ideal. The Australian, cramped in time and tradition, caught between an old world and one yet to be born, was occupied with problems that touched him more closely than deeply. It followed that when the churches, in general, kept to the by-ways of national life the Australian liked to feel that in good and bad times he could put out a hand and touch, not the hand of God but his brother's.

It was never an atmosphere in which real religion could leap readily to life, because with all its good points it only scratched the surface. It was sentimental rather than deeply emotional. Today, with life more organized and less speculative, it is a static and somewhat threadbare faith. We cling to it as a habit and because it still touches us through our literature. In theory the churches made occasional half-hearted attempts to give Christian sanctions to ideals of mateship, but in practice they usually stood with those who wanted to see the worker divided.

The exception was the Roman Catholic Church, which roughly represents one-fifth of the population. Behind the Celtic tradition in the social struggle, reflected strongly in our literature, was the unified strength of Roman Catholicism. It was largely a worker's church (it is not quite the same today), and Rome had an interest in seeing that the working man got a more generous share of the fruits of his labors. This was at a time when Rome's own position was akin to that of the worker. She was fighting for an established place for herself in the Australian sun, meeting with mistrust and bigotry, and undoubtedly understood the heart of the working man better than any other section of the Church.

As a part of the struggle Rome set out to get and eventually achieved political influence out of all proportion to her numerical strength. The irony of it, now that Rome is strong in the trade unions and in

the councils of the Labor Party, is that she never wanted more than a few important reforms. She had no desire to have the worker look beyond effect to the deeper causes. A doctrinaire working-class was to be abhorred, and today Rome is using her political power to see that the deeper causes are never made a final issue. Yet to the present the Roman Catholic Church has had greater success in Australia than any other section of the Church. Whether it has meant more religion or promises a broader democracy for the future is a matter for doubt. One thing is certain: Rome's present attitude is helping the Communists.

In a less obvious way the Church of England, nominally twice as strong as the Roman Catholic Church, has done much to determine the Australian way of life, even if, with the other churches, it has failed to inject into it a strong dose of Christianity. With its broad religious and intellectual sympathies the Church of England has set a fair model for a democracy. There have been times when it leaned heavily towards conservatism, but it has rarely persecuted its liberal thinkers and rebels, who have been slowly leavening the whole lump. With a growing ability to see and correct its own weaknesses the Church of England in Australia may one day be found giving a lead in the direction of welding the Australian's search for a complete democracy with a desire to seek for God.

There is little more that can be honestly stated for the churches. The religious bodies not already mentioned have had their share in shaping both the good and bad trends in our national life. There have been many churchmen who have thrown in their lot with the underdog, but little concerted effort has resulted. Practically all religious literature produced in Australia reflects a lack of any sustained and coherent interest in social problems. One might stress the intangible factors, but as there are no standards of measurement the attempt could easily result in dishonesty of thought. It is better to confess to a large measure of failure, and with God's help try to do better in the future.

ACTIVITIES OF THE FELLOWSHIP

The Executive Committee of the Frontier Fellowship is now carrying out a program voted by the members at the last two conferences. Success of this program will require widespread cooperation.

The Fellowship has agreed that this is both an urgent and a propitious time to bring a wider realization of the social concerns of Christianity. Therefore it has decided upon a modest program to extend the influence and membership of the group.

A new pamphlet explaining the aims of the Fellowship has been prepared and sent to all members. It is being distributed among prospective members with evident favorable results. As part time executive secretary, the Fellowship has been fortunate to secure Robert M. Brown, former assistant chaplain at Amherst and now a graduate student at Union and Columbia. Mr. Brown's efforts have already, in a very short time, added to the strength of the Fellowship, both in efficiency and in number of members.

The Executive Committee has prepared a budget of \$1100 to be raised by contributions during the current fiscal year. Of

this budget \$700 covers normal annual operating expenses, including the subsidy for *Christianity and Society*. This sum, somewhat swollen by inflation, represents the need which the Fellowship has had, year in and year out. The remaining \$400, of which half is the very small salary of the executive director, is earmarked for extending our influence.

The budget was approved enthusiastically by the Fall Conference in October, the only criticisms coming from those who thought it too small. The Conference reached a high point of enthusiasm for the work of the Fellowship. Volunteers are now contributing extensive efforts to the new program.

Members and friends have made very generous contributions to the Fellowship. It will still be necessary, however, for a larger percentage of the members to contribute toward the budget. Just as important is the job of spreading our message. Any who can influence prospective members are asked to do so, or to send names to the executive secretary, at 3041 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. R.L.S.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Will Herberg is director of research and education of the New York Dressmakers Union of the ILGWU. A former editor of the independent labor weekly, *Workers Age*, he is a well-known contributor to several periodicals.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS. By *Paul Tillich*, New York: Scribner, 1948. 186 pp. \$2.50.

This volume of sermons will be enthusiastically received by those who are concerned with the problem of communication in preaching. In language borrowed anywhere from daily life to philosophy, Dr. Tillich endeavors to preach the Biblical message in such a way that interpretative meaning is a part of the power of the Gospel. Aware that traditional terminology has lost its meaning for many within and without the church, he utilizes categories from all areas of life in an attempt to express the dynamic pulse through which the traditional language must be understood. In this way, he does not replace the language of the church, but tries to recover its full import for the life of today.

Those who read sermons for the sake of abstracting pulpit material will be disappointed in this volume. That is all to the good. The discerning person will find the book far more valuable in the implied approach to preaching. Certainly this volume ought not be judged by whether or not the sermons could be preached as they are in the average congregation. The fact is that they were preached to student groups and secular intellectuals from various fields. But the problem of communication is so significant for all of us that one can learn from this venture even where the situation is different. I remember my own struggles in this respect as a Navy chaplain; now I daily experience the trials of trying to make understandable, much less impart, the Christian faith to the inquiring secular mind. Finding a framework in which to express the living Spirit of Christianity is a problem no generation, particularly this one, can escape.

Those who are interested in Tillich's thought will probably find that these sermons give an introduction to his thinking which is more readily understandable than

his systematic essays. Tillich himself gives this as one of the reasons for publishing the sermons. The sermons should definitely allay the fears of those who feel that his thought is neither sufficiently existential nor Christian. Here the implicit but not always overt Christian understanding of Tillich becomes explicit.

It is impossible to summarize the range of material covered in these sermons. Taken together, they constitute a miniature theology without this ever having been intended. The title of the volume is taken from the caption of the first sermon, in which the words of the prophet Isaiah about the shaking of the foundations are made to live in the context of contemporary social science and physics. In a sermon on the Beatitudes, the difference between Luke and Matthew concerning the poor and the poor in spirit is answered in the affirmation that the woes are pronounced upon those who were "unbroken in their relation to the present stage of the world" and that praise was pronounced upon "those who will be fulfilled in their whole being" (26).

The impossibility of escaping God is the burden of one of the most penetrating sermons in the collection. The beginning of atheism is only possible, writes Tillich, where theology "drags God down to the level of doubtful things" (45). Elsewhere, he succinctly declares that "genuine atheism is not humanly possible, for God is nearer to a man than that man is to himself. A God can only be denied in the name of another God; and God appearing in *one* form can only be denied by God appearing in another form" (128).

A sermon on the "Yoke of Religion," in which Christianity is considered the end of all religion, together with one on the "Witness of the Spirit," have more suggestions for an understanding of the Holy Spirit than most books on the problem. The common place conception of Jesus Christ is directly challenged in calling at-

tention to the fact that Christ is a vocational designation through the sermon "He who is the Christ." Students of Tillich will recognize this as similar to the phrase, "Jesus as the Christ."

Justification by faith receives a fresh treatment in the sermon, "You are accepted." In a sermon entitled "Waiting" one discovers comfort in the midst of one's own spiritual poverty and, at the same time, the basis for humility.

The full compass of the sermons mentioned and unmentioned can only be grasped by a careful reading. Anyone who is concerned with the problem of preaching in respect both to content and communication will find this book infinitely rewarding.

JOHN DILLENBERGER

CHURCH, LAW AND SOCIETY. *By Gustaf Aulén.* New York: Scribner, 1948.

The new theological outlook, with its recovery of Reformation theology and the biblical message of salvation through Christ, and the historical events of the last few decades which make withdrawal from the world by the church impossible and unthinkable, mark this as a propitious time to restudy the concept of the Law as the means of relating the church to society. This is the purpose of Bishop Aulén of Sweden in his valuable little book containing the Hewett lectures which he delivered at Union and other seminaries in 1947.

The Scandinavian Lutheran Church has always been able to find a more direct and positive relation to society than has, for instance, German Lutheranism, and after reading this book one can understand why this is so. Bishop Aulén argues that the traditional Lutheran view that the state is free to act according to its own "laws" of necessity is based on a false interpretation of Luther's distinction between the two governments, the "spiritual" and the "worldly." Whatever the merits of his interpretation of Luther, Bishop Aulén has provided us with a fine theological treatment of the function of the church in

society, particularly helpful in dealing with American misconceptions on this point. For if the tendency of continental Christianity is to be otherworldly about the relation of church and social policy, the temptation of most other forms of Christian thought is to moralize the Gospel and eventually to secularize the Kingdom of God. Bishop Aulén rejects both views and holds that in order to keep the right relation between church and society it is essential to recover the doctrine of the Law as the link between them.

By Law, Bishop Aulén means the Law of God, the universal Law "conceived not in a static or abstract way as a collection of fixed rules and paragraphs, but instead . . . as a *dynamis*, as a force working everywhere in human life." Its activity is not confined to the church only but it is working outside the church "as sure as the living God is working throughout the Universe." But in its full sense it is revealed to the church as the word of God. Aulén prefers to use the term Law, or Law of God, rather than natural law in order to distinguish his concept from the "natural law of catholics and humanists." This "natural law" as it is conventionally understood entered Christian thought as a secularized substitute for the Law of God when the idea of divine Law fell into disuse.

Properly interpreted the Law has a rightful function alongside the Gospel. But much confusion has resulted from Protestant misinterpretation of the function of the Law. Sometimes the idea of the Law has been combined with the idea of natural theology, or frequently it has been confused with the idea of the orders of creation in such a way as to place a special sanction upon historical institutions of society. Protestant Christianity especially has regarded the function of the Law as being primarily negative: sufficient only to lead man to repentance. And even more frequently, Protestantism has been inclined to reject the whole idea of the Law through a false interpretation of the Pauline condemnation of the Law as the enemy of the Gospel. "The Law," writes Bishop Aulén,

is not a way to God beside Christ; it is on the whole no way to God. But it is an instrument through which God realizes His Will in human life, fighting against the evil forces ravaging there." The Law is thus a force that subdues the destructive elements in humanity and provides the foundation of justice necessary for maintaining human fellowship.

This line of thought provides a helpful correction of the inclination of other continental thinkers, including Barth and Brunner, to separate the idea of justice from the idea of love. According to Bishop Aulén both the Gospel and the Law are expressions of God's love. In a fine passage he shows how love must express itself through the Law in the form of justice. "The 'love' . . . requested by the Law must in the first place be justice and righteousness. It must act as a living conscience fighting for the intentions of the Law in perpetually new situations. The direction of this activity is constant. Its purpose is unchangeable. But at the same time the principle in function can never be steadfastly tied to social and political theories of one kind or another, for instance neither to Conservative nor to Communist views. On the contrary the greatest possible mobility and elasticity are needed. The eyes of the church must be turned to all changing possibilities that allow an application of the principles" (p. 85).

The result is not to demand that the church be directly active in the social order, but rather to emphasize that the relation of Christianity to society is through the creative effort of Christians who take seriously their commission by the church to Christian vocation and who strive to bring a sense of God's justice and righteousness to the social order. It is the primary duty of the church "to strengthen the sense of true justice, according to the will of God as expressed in the law of the Creator."

Bishop Aulén carefully avoids all tendencies toward legalism in his interpretation of the Law and stresses that so far as Christians are concerned they must never

interpret the Law in a perfectionist or a monopolistic way. The Christian is still sinner and can never fulfill the Law of God completely; and non-Christians can know the Law and may, indeed have, fulfilled it more completely in history than many members of the Christian community.

It is to be hoped that this little book will be widely read in this country. It throws new light on the relationship of the church and society which should be helpful to American Christians.

PAUL ABRECHT

TRENDS IN PROTESTANT SOCIAL IDEALISM. *By J. Neal Hughley.* New York: Kings Crown Press, 1948. \$3.00.

The aim of this book is to examine critically the trends in Protestant social thought during the last quarter of a century. Dr. Hughley has concentrated his attention upon the works of E. Stanley Jones, Charles A. Ellwood, Francis J. McConnell, Kirby Page, Harry F. Ward, and Reinhold Niebuhr. His study provides an interesting addition to the history of American social idealism.

Hughley argues, contrary to the opinion of most students of the social gospel movement, that the social gospel era ended about 1918. While its influence continued to be felt in Christian social thinking over another two decades, the movement as a whole lost its unity and force. It never fully recovered from the shock which the first World War dealt to its optimistic and progressive view of human nature and society, and as a result of the political and economic catastrophes of the last ten years the trend has been toward a radical reconstruction of the theological and sociological premises of Christian social thinking.

But this interpretation tends to break down when applied to the first five men whom Hughley has studied. For by all the standards which he suggests, they are supreme representatives of the social gospel movement; and certainly the impact of the movement upon Christian thought gener-

ally reached its peak after, rather than before, the first World War. At any rate Dr. Hughley has not furnished sufficient evidence to make his case convincing.

The presentation of the thought of each of these figures is quite thorough and detailed but there seems to be no consistent basis of criticism and judgment.

After reading this review of the thought of Jones, Ellwood, McConnell, Page, and Ward, one is led to the observation that while they worked valiantly to make the church conscious of its social responsibilities in a new way, their own suggested proposals and solutions to the social problems of the day became steadily more irrelevant and impractical. Viewed from the hindsight of current Christian social thinking, one wonders how these men could have exercised the influence which they did.

PAUL ABRECHT

THE THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS. By *Werner Jaeger*. The Gifford Lectures, 1936. New York: Oxford University Press, 1948. vi, 259 pp. \$5.00.

The most significant feature of Professor Jaeger's excellent, even if too exclusively philological, treatment of the early Greek philosophers is the way in which he brings the religious and theological motives of these thinkers to the fore. "We shall find," says the author at the outset, "that the problem of the Divine occupies a much larger place in the speculations of the early natural philosophers than we are often ready to acknowledge, and that it receives in actuality a much greater share of their attention than we might be led to expect from Aristotle's picture of the development of philosophy in the first book of the *Metaphysics*" (p. 6). Such an emphasis is of particular importance at a time when philosophers, in so far as they are concerned with historical matters at all, tend to read past thinkers solely in the light of modern problems and especially in the light of the approach to these prob-

lems characteristic of modern physical science. Hence the recent tendency has been to look upon the pre-socratics as speculative *physicists* whose insights were at bottom poetic and "pre-scientific" (see pp. 7-8). On the basis of such a reading, the specifically religious and philosophic character of the question of "being" is lost. In direct opposition to this, Professor Jaeger seeks to throw light upon the theology of the early philosophers in order to remind us that when Thales or Anaximander, for example, approached the problem of being, or ultimate reality, they were in fact seeking out the nature of the Divine.

A preliminary word concerning a basic assumption of Professor Jaeger's is in order. He proposes a distinction between "truly philosophical thinking" and religious or theological thought (pp. 16-17). The former type, he says, finds the Divine *inside* the world, while the latter, particularly because of the stories in Genesis, shows the tendency to regard the Divine as outside the world. Professor Jaeger's thesis is that since the truth criterion of philosophical thought "lies in experience" philosophy must find God "inside experience." This is a confusion precisely because, apart from the ambiguity of the expression "inside experience," we cannot say, on the basis of *formal* considerations relating to the truth criterion of a type of thought, that certain *material* conclusions necessarily follow for that type. Leibniz, to give but one example, illustrates "truly philosophical thinking" but he argued very cogently that God *cannot* be a part of the world, but is extramundane. Hence we must regard this way of distinguishing between philosophy and theology as unsatisfactory.

The book contains a careful discussion of all the significant early Greek philosophers including the Milesian naturalists, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes. The author also presents a valuable analysis of certain problems closely allied with the study of religion and theology among the Greek thinkers before Plato. Professor Jaeger has a chapter on the Orphic Theo-

gonies, including a reappraisal of Rohde's interpretation of orphism in *Psyche*, one on the development of the idea of the soul's divinity, and also a chapter dealing with various theories of the origin of religion in which the only important single philosopher not receiving independent treatment, Democritus, is considered.

Certain theses suggested by the author will be of particular interest to Christian thinkers.

a) In the discussion of Thales and Anaximander (pp. 18ff.) the author calls attention to the religious aspect of the question of "being" and points out that man's awareness of Being and of the significance of the power of the whole, represents the attainment of a new standpoint for man from which he looks triumphantly down upon the chaos of the lesser powers that were threatening his very existence (see p. 23).

b) The author, in his section on Xenophanes, contends that universalism with respect to the idea of God must be understood as a contribution of the Greeks (p. 18), and not of either the Hebrews or the Christians. In this connection Professor Jaeger cites Augustine's expressed agreement with Plato's philosophy (*De Civ. Dei*, viii) as a recognition that Plato was a precursor of Christian belief in this respect. The difficulty here is that "universalism" is taken by the author only in the sense that all the various local and tribal gods are ultimately expressions of one God not identical with these local or tribal deities, and in this sense universalism may indeed be said to be the contribution of the Greeks. However if "universalism" is taken to mean that one particular historical apprehension of God is an apprehension of the God who is indeed God of the universe and is, in this sense, "universal," then Professor Jaeger's contention must be qualified accordingly, for this second type is in fact the universalism of both the Hebrew prophets and the Christian writers.

c) In commenting on the fragments of

Parmenides, the author points out that Being (*on*) and God (*theos*) are not identified and that the properly religious element in his work consists not so much "in any classification of the object of his research as divine" (p. 107), as in Parmenides' own concern for the finality of the question he raises and the effect which his discovery has upon him as a human being. This is, I think, one of the most important insights in the book.

d) Some light is thrown upon the meaning of *pistis* (the word used most often in the N.T. and LXX for "faith") in Professor Jaeger's treatment of Empedocles (pp. 143ff.). Here he refers to the inner certainty or conviction concerning the truth of his doctrine, although it is not altogether clear, as the author points out, what the relation is between the *pistis* present in the religious concern and that which is required for his theory of nature (see note 76 on Empedocles).

e) Of particular significance in Professor Jaeger's discussion of Diogenes of Apollonia is the historic fact that as we come to the end of the so-called pre-socratic period, the problem of God's form (*morphē*) is no longer central, and the problem (actually no problem previously) of God's existence comes to the fore (see p. 169). What was formerly taken as an immediate certainty now requires a discursive proof.

f) The concluding chapter dealing with theories of the nature and origin of religion is especially interesting and it is well to call attention to the author's criticism of those who would completely identify "religion" as a generic term for a universal feature of human experience, with some special religious tradition (p. 172).

Much more might be said in detail, but space does not permit. The book as a whole is a valuable contribution to a much discussed subject. Philosophers, theologians, and classicists are greatly in debt to the labors of Professor Jaeger.

JOHN E. SMITH

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